Pavlina Ann Novosádová: Online Public Shaming and its Shift of Moral Expectations. In: Ostium, vol. 21, 2025, no. 4.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Online public shaming (OPS) has given rise to a number of ethical concerns regarding accountability, morality, and community behavior. While existing literature debates whether OPS is ethical or not, this article moves beyond that and offers two original points of contemplation. First, understanding shame as an evolved behavior and its transferal to the online sphere, and second, analyzing the shift of moral expectation. Unlike traditional forms of shame, which place moral expectations on the transgressor to demonstrate improved behavior, OPS can permanently expel individuals, leaving little room for redemption. Consequently, the moral expectation shifts to the online community, tasked with expressing dissent and acting against perceived wrongdoing. The ways in which the online community react to instances of OPS can ultimately demonstrate their moral character and standing in a group.
Keywords: online public shaming, moral expectation, evolutionary psychology, online ethics
1. Introduction
With the rise of internet usage and digital transformation, we are assigned a new set of ethical dilemmas to help effectively navigate the online sphere; one out of many include the ethics of online public shaming. Proponents roughly argue for the ways in which online shaming can instill desired behavior and values into the online community while opponents question if this means to good behavior is reasonable or even ethical. While this article acknowledges the existing debate on “whether to publicly shame online or not” the main thesis goes beyond that, instead offering two original points of contemplation. The first is understanding shame as an evolved behavior in relation to its transferal online and the second analyzes the shift of moral expectation in online public shaming. That is to say, when compared to other (past-private, past-public, current-private, current-offline-public) shamings, moral expectation extends beyond those subject to online shaming. The moral expectation now instead falls on the online community in expressing their dissent, but more on this later in section 4. Understanding this shift of moral expectation may ultimately (and hopefully) influence further contemplations on the usefulness, ethics, or purposes of online public shaming.
Before delving into the argument at large, this article dedicates a significant amount of attention to the existing understandings of online public shaming following relevant philosophical literature. While other works tend to overlook the significant question of “why do we shame in the first place” space is dedicated to exploring the evolutionary psychological explanation for shame. Points made here support my fundamental claim on how online public shaming has experienced a shift of moral expectation. Regarding other forms of shame, expectations fell/fall to the transgressor to demonstrate improved behaviors. Regarding online public shaming, severe cases—as seen with Lindsey Stone and Justine Sacco—can permanently expel transgressors from the online (and often offline) world, not allowing them to prove their moral character and/or worth. Since the regenerative purpose of shame is absent online, onlookers, others part of the online community, are expected to take a moral standing by piling on to the shaming and take action against immoral behavior, thus endowing them with moral expectations.
2. Online Public Shaming
When talking about online public shaming (OPS), the term itself proves self-explanatory in its fundamental characteristic: mass shaming that happens in the cyber world. While OPS is the larger, more general practice, various specific actions drive or support shamings online such as boycotting, publicizing private information, or publicly challenging immoral behavior. Respectively, these practices are often referred to as cancel culture, doxxing, and calling out.[1] This article treats OPS as the umbrella term as it captures the essential function—public moral condemnation—that drives these specific practices. Cancel culture, doxxing, and calling out are thus realizations and/or manifestations of OPS.
While online shaming may occur for various reasons (aesthetical displeasure, sexual promiscuity, religious shaming, etc.) this article will primarily focus on shame that addresses breaches of “morally authoritative social norms”. As Paul Billingham and Tom Parr explain: these are norms which “individuals have a duty to comply, such that violating them is wrongful,” such as norms revolving around sexism and racism to name a few.[2] However, as with Billingham and Parr’s approach, inquiring into what makes norms morally authoritative goes beyond the scope of this research. Furthermore, motivations to uphold such norms can stem from political and or ideological commitments or even intrinsic reasons like sense of ethical conviction. Again however, this article does not set aside room to consider which specific motivations are at play.
When it comes to defining this limitation, shame that targets breaches of morally authoritative social norms remains the interest of relevant philosophical works as it gives rise to applicable philosophical questions such as: is it ethical to shame online if it aims to defend moral values, what are moral reasonings against OPS, and what are the moral expectations under OPS?
Additionally in continuing our understanding of OPS as such, OPS does share a quite significant amount of similarities to shame in terms of aims and practices as one might assume. Such a thing can be expected as, already pointed out, it is a form of shame which simply occurs in the online world. With that being said, let us consider what such works have identified on OPS.
First and foremost Billingham and Parr point out that OPS is public shaming that has simply “gone digital.”[3] Jon Ronson in his book: So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, reminds readers that the practice of public shaming is not necessarily new to us, as both the United States and the United Kingdom (as well as Ancient Greece, France, and numerous other civilizations which Ronson does not cite) had their own forms of public shaming, albeit they went out of practice a little before the 1840’s.[4] Even Krista K. Thomason agrees with this idea that shaming practices are not new for us and states that “It seems that as long as we have been online, we have been finding ways to digitally shame each other.”[5] Nevertheless, following sections now will explore chosen authors’ nuanced perspectives on the practice.
2.1 Positive and Negative Perceptions
Billingham and Parr suggest that the common understanding of OPS is “the use of the Internet to draw attention to and criticize (perceived) wrongdoings.”[6] Furthermore, these two writers highlight that OPS is an informal sanction that deals with norm transgressions which go beyond legislature. Social norms instead regulate a groups’ attitudes and behaviors, governing how individuals should act. This can and does include etiquette, manners, and fairness, areas that legislation does not and cannot fully control. Here we can see that social norms are indeed important as laws are not sufficient in ensuring behaviors we would like and or expect from others. Thomason offers a similar perspective in which she states that OPS is a way of objecting to offensive online communication—[7]I myself would include behavior since even offline “immoral” acts can and do become target of online scrutiny, such as Dog Poop Girl.[8]
Guy Aitchison and Saladin Meckled-Garcia hold a more pessimistic view of OPS, arguing that OPS is ultimately a reputational punishment, as it imposes a “distinctive type of reputational cost on people…”[9] which poses severe effects on people’s personal lives especially in the realms of relationships and employment.[10] As a result, online shaming ultimately “characterizes people’s personalities and moral characters as unworthy of participation in certain human relationships and so as worthy of social exclusion”.[11] Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia clearly hold a negative understanding of OPS, however considering different perspectives can offer a more fair and well-rounded understanding.
All in all, if there were any doubts before, here we can clearly see that OPS is indeed a punishment. First and foremost Herbert Morris explains that legitimate punishment can be a maintenance for social control.[12] Whether or not OPS is legitimate (or morally acceptable) is controversial, however, it does aim to socially control and eradicate immoral behavior. Moreover, according to Morris, if one were to violate given rules, then steps would be taken to deprive that someone of something valuable.[13] In the case of OPS, the violation would be some immoral behavior while the deprivation, on Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia’s suggestion, would be the loss of or attack on reputation.[14]
Beyond direct actions, some people look at OPS’s role and effects in shaping communities and maintaining and supporting hierarchies within them. Thus, beyond OPS’s aim to punish immoral behaviors, it is a way in which members of a community can regulate other’s behaviors and actions, ultimately creating morally desirable norms.[15] Through shaming, members (in this case the online community) can come to understand what behaviors and rhetoric are acceptable which may help individuals navigate further online interactions. Even Billingham and Parr mention that beyond creating social norms, OPS can further enforce them by having members comply to them in the face of shame (or rather the avoidance of being shamed).[16] Nevertheless, similar to Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia’s remarks on OPS lacking legitimacy, critics might question who has the standing authority to create and enforce these norms.[17]
Although existing literature can define online public shaming (OPS) and describe what motivates participation, it does not fully address the question of why we engage in shaming online in the first place. Some scholars suggest OPS is a way to uphold social norms, others see it as “moral self-defense”,[18] or even a form of moral grandstanding.[19] While these explanations capture part of the story, they do not acknowledge the deeper question: what drives us to shame one another in a digital context at all?
3. Why do we Shame Online?
Earlier sections of this article have already touched upon the sentiment or observation that the practice of OPS is not completely alien to us as public shaming practices have been pursued historically and virtually all over the world. In answering why it is however, we might benefit from considering why we shame in the first place. In coming to such answer, we may turn to evolutionary psychology to tell us more.[20]
Concerning evolutionary psychology, certain lines of thinking credit shame as a fundamental part of our species’ evolution. Specifically, evolutionary psychology views shame as one of the decisive factors that pushed our species’ survival and thus can explain why we continue to pursue shaming even to this day despite its controversial nature.[21] While there exist two hypotheses surrounding shame as an evolutionary mechanic—the appeasement ritual hypothesis and social devaluation defense hypothesis—this article will focus on the latter. The two hypotheses are indeed different, but not necessarily at odds with one another. The appeasement ritual hypothesis considers shame’s evolutionary use in deescalating conflict and signaling subordination or even cooperation with a dominant other.[22] The social devaluation defense theory ultimately proves a bit more relevant to the scope of this article and is thus the one in focus.
3.1 Social Devaluation Defense Hypothesis
Shame most notably served as a tool to promote cooperation especially during difficult periods. Evidence suggests that humans evolved in a competitive and harsh environment; relying on other humans for assistance to secure survival and reproduction was common practice. However when someone was faced with the decision to help or withhold assistance they would assess their decision on a welfare trade off computation. In other words, they would take the information they had available on the person asking for help to determine if helping them would prove beneficial. If information reveals that the individual needing assistance is unable to enforce the interests of the individual able to assist them, the assisting individual will place less weight on the other’s welfare. The one asking for assistance will ultimately be devalued by the one capable of rendering assistance.[23]
Preventing social devaluation proved to thus be a major adaptation problem and shame evolved precisely to defend against devaluation. When faced with the likelihood and cues of devaluation, shame would activate as a response and “arrange a suite of cognitive mechanisms”.[24] For instance, one mechanism could deter a devalued (or potentially devalued) individual from pursuing acts that would cost more “in terms of social devaluation than personal payoffs the action would otherwise yield”.[25] In other words, if a devalued individual was faced with the opportunity of stealing food from the group, the prospect of being further devalued would outweigh the benefit of acquiring the stolen food. Furthermore, shame proved useful against devaluation as it would limit the extent of which others hear about and further share devaluating information.[26]
Although centuries have passed and the world has undergone significant changes, shame has remained an essential part of our behavior. Shame still works similar, if not the same, physical effects on us through the reddening of faces, collapsing of posture, and a physical suggestion of subordination that communicates to others that it is permissible to put less value on our welfare. Shame still, as explored above, plays a vital role in shaping and enforcing norms. This is all to say that shame has and doubtlessly continues to form a significant part of human social life.
For a balanced perspective, it is important to note that the approach of evolutionary psychology itself has become a problematic one even beyond the topic of shame. Some question to what extent evolutionary psychology offers a reliable understanding of human behavior, as it more or less boils everything down to one’s genetic makeup thus taking the absolute stance of “nature” in the nature versus nurture debate. Opponents further push the possibility that one’s behavior is also significantly, if not fully, determined by one’s environment, believing that, for instance, cultural variances and individual unique characters also play a major role in shaping behavior.[27] While these critiques may prove valid, when it comes to shame, its evolutionary basis may still stand. Both current psychology and cultural studies react, although perhaps not intentionally, to such perceived “shortcomings.”
3.2 Psychology and Culture of Shame
Psychology tells us that people have various tolerance levels when it comes to shame. Some experience it so severely that it causes adverse effects, going against the potential original intentions, such as leading them to hide, distance themselves, or even become angry at those who have shamed them. It may leave permanent psychological damage and or depression in some, while inspiring forgiveness and motivation to do better for others.[28] At the end of the day, the way people react to shame and what they do with it, will depend on their character, personality, and predispositions. Yet, deviations amongst individuals does not necessarily force us to conclude the evolutionary basis of shame as wholly faulty or irrelevant.
As for cultural differences, it is safe to believe that virtually all cultures have a conception of shame, and use shame in their relational practices. However, the ways in which people experience shame substantially differs from culture to culture.
First and foremost, the term “shame” itself can be very limiting to the context of English speakers and the connotations and our understanding of shame can and will significantly vary from another culture’s translation of shame. For instance, linguists and historians often struggle with translating the Ancient Greek word “aidos” as it encaptures what English speakers understand as shame, modesty, and even respect.[29] It is argued that the Japanese for instance, do not differentiate between embarrassment and shame; if they do, the two concepts still significantly overlap one another.[30] To additionally highlight how the understandings of shame are so complex, American college students, even as native speakers, use guilt and shame synonymously.[31] Yet, all cultures seem to have a term for something we, as English speakers, understand as shame, even if some terms encompass a wider range of emotions.
Further cultural differences are explored by Owen Flanagan who explains that not only do we express emotions differently, we have different rules regarding emotional displays. Some might believe we let others off too easily for their immoral behavior and as such it warrants proper shaming. Others claim that humans always deserve mercy and forgiveness and should never be written off completely.[32] All in all, Flanagan aims to point out that cultures have, of course, differing norms tied to emotions such as shame, but also “preferred scripts” on how to appropriately express, or even apply, these emotions. Thus while various cultures put different levels of emphasis on the importance of shame and how it should be expressed, it is still a cross-cultural emotion experienced worldwide.[33]
In essence, we might conclude that shame, as an evolved behavior, has simply transitioned to the online world—the major difference being the vastly larger scale at which it now occurs as 1) more information is open to public than ever before and 2) it is able to spread quickly and globally.[34] As Billingham and Parr point out, “… the phenomenon of public shaming has kept pace with technological progress. Public shaming has gone digital.”[35] Perhaps there is not much more to uncover concerning this matter especially when considering how a number of social practices transferred online (communication, dating, education…). With the move to technology, public shaming has simply become one of the practices to find its position in the online sphere, most notably on social media. Nevertheless, current literature suggests a new reason for OPS unlike, but not necessarily at odds with, the one offered by evolutionary psychology.
3.3 Hearing what we Want to Hear
Jon Ronson in So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed explores how echo chambers and feedback loops have become a significant side effect of OPS.[36] However, I would go as far as arguing, if Ronson has not already, that echo chambers and feedback loops have pushed OPS in to becoming more common practice than expected. As mentioned earlier in Adam Curtis’s analysis of echo chambers and feedback loops, information that challenges the status quo or shared morality of a given group gets pushed out. People that challenge the status quo or shared morality get pushed out. Curtis additionally mentions that
Twitter passes lots of information around. But it tends to be the kind of information that people know that others in their particular network will like… in return, those others will like the person who gave them that piece of information. So information becomes a currency through which you buy friends and become accepted into the system.[37]
If we were to look at this through the eyes of OPS, we could see this going down in one of (at least) three ways. 1) People pile on to the shaming thus stabilizing the fact that they share the groups sentiments and follow the status quo (that is if the group stands by and accepts the shaming) and successfully remain in the group. 2) People reject the shaming thus challenging the groups sentiments and possibly get pushed out. 3) People remain neutral neither shaming or defending the shamee, and based on the radicalness of the group either remain or get pushed out for complacency. Here however, is exactly where I think we see the most interesting shift: people are judged based their reactions to a shaming.
As Ronson mentioned around Curtis’s explanation of echo chambers and feedback loops, people express that Justine Sacco is a monster for her poorly expressed AIDS joke on twitter, and get congratulated immediately.[38] Ronson on the other hand in his book expresses that Sacco is not a monster and worries about the backlash he could face.[39] While Ronson speaks very specifically about his own experience, but I do not think it is unique to him; this has become the standard of shaming, especially online, where moral expectations have shifted.
4. The Moral Expectational Shift in Online Public Shaming
If readers have learned anything from Ronson’s book and other literature on OPS, it is that once someone has been shamed online, it is difficult to return to normal life—and even more difficult to rejoin the group from which they have been expelled.[40] Obvious consequences include compromised mental health and damaged reputations, however less obvious is what potentially drives expulsion: the person expelled from the group might no longer be needed.
Shame in the early days punished a violator’s bad behavior yet it never expelled them from a group completely. As Toni Massaro explains, instances of shaming in pre-World War II Japan and Colonial America was “not understood in these communities as an expression of contempt that permanently renounces or expels the shame[d] member.”[41] Criticism and punishment were still essential for norm violations, however, perhaps more importantly was the ultimate aim of reconciliation—not severance—between the transgressor and their community. Now, as Kate Klonick points out, punishments of OPS prove endless.[42] Although not the central focus of this article, possible lack of expulsion and temporary punishment could stem from needs for cooperation; if multiple people faced expulsion from a group, there would not be enough individuals to make cooperation feasible. With the size of groups and population today, we do not experience such a threat, as we have an abundance of helping hands ready, or an even larger amount of potential replacements. Nevertheless, it does not mean we wish to be excluded from the group due to psychological factors and needs of feeling included and belongingness.
This is precisely where I would argue we see a moral expectational shift in shame. Originally, shame placed moral expectations on the transgressor, who then had to work their way back into being accepted and trusted by the group. That no longer appears to be the case in the online world, as mentioned earlier, where redemption is difficult, if not impossible, for those cast out for their perceived immoral behavior. Such victims of OPS seem to have had only one chance (some might argue without warning) and “failed” it, leaving them no opportunity for a second. In this sense, we could argue that they have been stripped of moral expectations, having already been condemned to ruin by their (im)moral faults.
Perhaps the moral expectations now lies in the crowd, those on the online sphere who can pile on to the shaming. Aitchison and Meckled-Garcia differentiate between two categories of agents who participate in online shaming: 1) “those who initiate or incite others,” and 2) “those who ‘pile on’ by adding to the derision heaped on the target with more social media commentary or with likes and retweets.”[43] Billingham and Parr even point out that shamers indeed turn to the internet to denounce misconduct, and in the same stroke, “appeal to others to join them in their condemnation.”[44] Beyond this appeal, and whether agents fall in the former or latter category, we can, most importantly, see what position others take in a moral conflict. Do you condemn the misconduct or defend the transgressor? Do you claim Justine Sacco a racist for her AIDS tweet and signal your dissent on such blatant ignorance, despite it being a joke? Do you stand up to her attempt at an innocent joke that was obviously misread? Whatever action you choose communicates to others your position on a moral dilemma. Justine Sacco obviously failed her chance at proving her moral character, but her failure gives you the opportunity to either establish yours, or fail along with her. By condemning Justine’s racist actions through inciting or piling on to the public shaming, you communicate to the group that you are aware of her immoral behavior, believe racism should be punished, and confirm your moral character to your audience, whereas defending Justine might communicate the opposite.[45]
Shaming, minimally in the online sphere, is no longer a method of punishment to motivate transgressors to improve their behavior. Although literature suggests that it is an aim and potential benefit of OPS, critiques of this practice point out the obvious: people subject to OPS have very little room for redemption and keeping watch for further moral behavior in these people have become less of a priority. When it comes to today’s OPS that priority has transformed: once someone has been shamed, we now watch how others respond to it. In essence, I claim that there has been a significant shift in moral expectations when it comes to shaming online.
Originally, transgressors were expected to prove their good behavior in order to be welcomed back into a group. Now, people active in the online community assume the moral role of condemning the transgressor. In the past, after violating norms and values, transgressors were given the opportunity to demonstrate their moral standing and earn a second chance. Such demonstrations could be as simple as avoiding similar improper behavior or as proactive as taking positive action—for example, someone shamed for sexist behavior might turn around and raise money for feminist organizations. The essential point is that, rather than being permanently cast out, transgressors were allowed room to prove their moral character and be reaccepted by the group.
Shame as such was not designed to permanently expel members of a group especially when it came to transgressions that did not significantly challenge their fitness and chances of survival. Alternatively, shame allowed, on the one hand, to practically punish wrong doers, and, on the other, give them opportunity to remain useful members who abide by norms. As such, we do not witness this same interaction at play with regards to online public shaming, as anyone faces potential expulsion for perceived moral breaches, thus prompting individuals to reaffirm their moral stances when they can, even at the cost of someone else.
5. Conclusion
In recent years philosophical literature has explored the nature, causes, and effects of OPS, which has undoubtedly led to disagreements amongst scholars. While proponents highlight the ways in which OPS fights for good by upholding moral standards, punishing norm violators, and expressing a sense of solidarity in communities, opponents question if the benefits outweigh the negatives. OPS can and often becomes overzealous, leaving victims with mental distress and tarnished reputations which may, because of the internet, remain with them forever. Nevertheless, while this article does not aim to take a “in favor of or not” position, it hopes to highlight two new points of contemplation: 1) understanding shame from the perspective of evolutionary psychology and 2) highlighting the shift of moral expectations. However, the main thesis of this article remains: while shame puts moral expectations on the transgressor and expects them to prove their good behavior, that expectation under OPS now falls on people in the online sphere who are expected to demonstrate their moral standings by reacting to instances of OPS. Thus, this article offers a new insight to the moral shift happening in online public shaming. Such an understanding may respond to the debates on OPS by perhaps explaining the perceived harshness of this practice, or by undermining the believed altruistic motivations behind OPS.
OPS concerns many and various cases, and interestingly enough, celebrity or big corporate targets rarely experience total group expulsion as compared to everyday, ordinary people. While such variations could challenge the thesis I set out here, I believe it offers room for subsequent work.
The text was funded by the EU’s NextGenerationEU through the Recovery and Resilience Plan for Slovakia under project No. 09I03-03-V02-00018.
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N o t e s
[1] CANCEL CULTURE: Merriam-Webster Dictionary [online], 2025-04-02 [accessed 2025-09-23]. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cancel%20culture; DOX: Merriam-Webster Dictionary [online], 2025-03-29 [accessed 2025-09-23]. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doxxing; CALLOUT: Merriam-Webster Dictionary [online], 2025-04-02 [accessed 2025-09-23]. Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/call%20out;
[2] BILLINGHAM, P. – PARR, T.: Online Public Shaming: Virtues and Vices. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 51(3), 2019, pp. 371–390, p. 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12308
[3] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 1.
[4] RONSON, J.: So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed. London: Picador 2015, p. 9.
[5] THOMASON, K. K.: The Moral Risks of Online Shaming. In: The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2021, p. 1. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198857815.013.8
[6] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 3.
[7] THOMASON, The Moral Risks of Online Shaming, p. 6.
[8] A girl from South Korea (infamously known as Dog Poop Girl) neglected to clean up her dog’s feces once it defecated on the metro. Someone snapped a picture of it and shared it online where it gained millions of views and an onslaught of criticism aimed towards the girl. HENIG, S.: The Tale of Dog Poop Girl Is Not so Funny After All. Columbia Journalism Review [online], 2005-07-07 [accessed 2025-09-23]. Available at: https://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_tale_of_dog_poop_girl_is_n.php.
[9] This and following information from Aitchison and Garcia is taken from a draft of their work.
[10] AITCHISON, G. – MECKLED-GARCIA, S.: Against Online Public Shaming. Social Theory and Practice, vol. 47, 2020, no. 1, pp. 1–31, p. 2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20201117109
[11] AITCHISON – MECKLED-GARCIA, Against Online Public Shaming, p. 2.
[12] MORRIS, H.: On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology. Berkeley: University of California Press 1976, p. 33.
[13] MORRIS, On Guilt and Innocence, p. 36.
[14] AITCHISON – MECKLED-GARCIA, Against Online Public Shaming, p. 2.
[15] THOMASON, The Moral Risks of Online Shaming, p. 6.
[16] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 6.
[17] AITCHISON – MECKLED-GARCIA, Against Online Public Shaming, p. 2.
[18] LIM, J. E.: Public Shaming as Moral Self-Defence. Social Theory and Practice, vol. 51, no. 3, 2025, pp. 437–460, p. 437. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2025915246
[19] TOSI, J. – WARMKE, B.: Moral Grandstanding. Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol., 44, no. 3, 2016, pp. 197–217, p. 197. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12075
[20] One could argue that shame and OPS have little in common beyond a term, as OPS does not guarantee that transgressors will undergo the emotional experience of shame. I argue that what makes these two connected is the fact that they are used as social tools in shaping desired community behaviors. To shame in person does not guarantee that the transgressor will feel shame, just as shaming online does not. The point of relevant similarity falls in the fact that shame is employed to draw the transgressors (and others) attention to faulty behavior, and further motivate avoidance of similar acts. However, the ways in which shame is employed online are significantly more intense and harsh.
[21] Evolutionary psychology sets out to study human behavior from a biological perspective. Evolutionary psychologists most notably put forward that much of human behavior can be explained by “appeal[ing] to internal psychological mechanisms,” which we have adapted through natural selection to push our species’ movement, survival, and reproduction. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [online], 2024-01-30 [accessed 2025-09-23]. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evolutionary-psychology/
[22] FLANAGAN, O.: How to Do Things With Emotions: The Morality of Anger and Shame Across Cultures. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2023.
[23] SZNYCER, D. – XYGALATAS, D. – AGEY, E. – ALAMI, S. – AN, X.-F. – ANANYEVA, K. I. – ATKINSON, Q. D. – et al.: Cross-cultural Invariances in the Architecture of Shame. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 115, no. 39, 2018, pp. 9702–9707, pp. 1–2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805016115
[24] SZNYCER et al., Cross-cultural Invariances in the Architecture of Shame, p. 2.
[25] SZNYCER et al., Cross-cultural Invariances in the Architecture of Shame, p. 2.
[26] SZNYCER et al., Cross-cultural Invariances in the Architecture of Shame, p. 2.
[27] WOODLEY OF MENIE, M. A. – PEÑAHERRERA-AGUIRRE, M. – SARRAF, M. A. – FERNANDES, H. B. F. – ARMSTRONG, E. – KAVANAGH, A. – FIGUEREDO, A. J.: Soft Core Evolutionary Psychology? Potential Evidence Against a Unified Research Program From a Survey of 581 Evolutionarily Informed Scholars. Evolutionary Psychological Science 9(4), 2023, pp. 397–406. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40806-023-00370-3
[28] TERRIZZI, J. A. Jr. – SHOOK, N. J.: On the Origin of Shame: Does Shame Emerge From an Evolved Disease-Avoidance Architecture? In: Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, vol., 14, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2020.00019
[29] CAIRNS, D. L.: Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993, pp. 1–3.
[30] LEBRA, T. S.: Shame and Guilt: A Psychocultural View of the Japanese Self. In: Ethos, vol. 11, 1983, no. 3, pp. 192–209, p. 194.
[31] TANGNEY, J. P. – MILLER, R. S. – FLICKER, L. – BARLOW, D. H.: Are Shame, Guilt, and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions? In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 70, 1996, no. 6, pp. 1256–1269. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1256
[32] FLANAGAN, O.: How to Do Things With Emotions: The Morality of Anger and Shame Across Cultures. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2023, section “Doing Emotions.”
[33] LANDERS, M. – SZNYCER, D.: The Evolution of Shame and Its Display. In: Evolutionary Human Sciences, vol. 4, 2022, e45. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ehs.2022.43
[34] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 7.
[35] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 1.
[36] RONSON, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, pp. 266–267.
[37] CURTIS as cited in RONSON, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, pp. 266–267.
[38] Before boarding a plane to South Africa Justine Sacco tweets: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” once the plane lands Sacco finds herself target of an onslaught of online shaming. RONSON, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed.
[39] RONSON, So You’ve Been Publicly Shamed, pp. 267–268.
[40] Interestingly enough however, this does not seem to be the case for highly popular and long liked celebrities such as J.K. Rowling and Kanye West, as well as people who do not express shame for their actions like some individuals Ronson (2015) mentions in his book.
[41] MASSARO, T. M.: The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform. In: Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, vol. 3, 1997, no. 4, pp. 645–704, p. 682.
[42] KLONICK, K.: Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age. In: SSRN Electronic Journal [online], 2015-01-01, p. 1054. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2638693
[43] AITCHISON – MECKLED-GARCIA, Against Online Public Shaming, p. 9.
[44] BILLINGHAM – PARR, Online Public Shaming, p. 1.
[45] This position is not an all or nothing stance as people may have other reasons for piling on to the shaming, some of which most notably lies in a desire for blatant cruelty and/or the exercising of power.
MgA. Pavlina Ann Novosádová
Systematic and applied philosophy Universita Cyril a Methoda
Námestie J. Herdu 2, 917 01 Trnava, Slovakia
e-mail: pavlina.jones@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0009-0004-0791-0952