Tomáš Čana: Meanings not associated with facts. In: Ostium, vol. 22, 2026, no. 2. (study)
This article attempts to critically analyze the traditional philosophical idea about the meanings of linguistic expressions that exist without being connected in any way with facts. In the works of various philosophers, the idea of linguistic meanings without association with what the world is like appears as something unproblematic and understandable. Among them, perhaps the most prominent are Meditations on First Philosophy by René Descartes. The main aim of the present article is to demonstrate that it only seems to us that we understand this philosophical idea. In fact, it leads us to several problems and questions. At the same time, the article attempts to disclose the reasons that could have been co-responsible for its apparent intelligibility.
Keywords: Philosophy of language, beliefs, meanings, communication, objectivity, autonomy, holism, rule, Davidson, Descartes
René Descartes claims that he once found himself in a situation where he was sure of the meaning of basic terms and methodological principles, but he was not sure of anything about the world.[1] In the Meditations on First Philosophy, he confesses that for days he felt himself in a state in which he was compelled by reason to doubt that what he was writing on was paper and what he was writing with was his hand, etc. At the same time, his reason did not encounter any problem with the meaning of terms “paper”, “hand”, “writing”, etc. He could not be certain that the day before he had five fingers on his right hand and on his left hand – or even that he had always had two hands. However, he was sure what it means that something cannot be the result of nothing or that more perfection can never be the consequence of less perfection.[2] In his view, there is nothing problematic or even worthy of attention about the reality of such a state.
In this investigation, I will refer to the idea of such a situation as the idea of meanings not associated with facts. In contrast, I will refer to the application of linguistic signs that we participate in daily as the idea of meanings associated with facts.
Since Descartes emphasises that he found himself in this induced state for days, it should follow that the idea of such a situation can be thought about without problems. In other words, it can be presented before others as an intelligent matter.[3] Anyone who can read (the Meditations, for example) should be able to grasp it. Why am I stressing this? The fact that we can end up in such a situation and at the same time are able to think about it without problems has a unique meaning within Descartes’s theoretical efforts. More concretely, the idea of such a state as something comprehensible leads us directly to the first – constitutive – principle of his system: I am thinking, therefore I exist. What’s more, it leads to it in the same way that a well-formulated question leads to a correct answer. Here is where the historical dimension of this investigation should reside.
However, the exceptional position that pertains to Descartes’s system within the philosophical and scientific thinking of the Modern era bears responsibility for the fact that the idea of the intimated state is influential and relevant, even today. To this day, many thinkers believe – when building systems of knowledge, in considerations about the category of certainty, about the mind, about the origin of the terms of psychology, etc. – that the idea of meanings not associated with facts can be thought of as something that works. Meaning that, still today, this concept enters discussions as a possibility to be considered.[4] On the other hand, much less attention is devoted to this possibility itself.[5]
From what has been presented thus far, it should be evident that this examination of the situation in which we have the meaning of basic terms and methodological principles but cannot be sure of anything about the world, should not be a historical investigation, but a substantive reassessment of a selected moment – or automatism – in our actual thinking. So, what will be of interest to us? We will reconstruct neither Descartes’s system nor his authentic motivations. We will ask: Is it truly possible to doubt everything external? Can a state in which we have linguistic signs but do not have problem-free contact with the world really be rationally reconstructed? Could we ever truly find ourselves in such a state? In addition: Is it right that the idea of such a situation enters discussions about knowledge, certainty, mind, etc. in such a way as if there can be no doubt about its coherence?
I.
Let us first imagine that we find ourselves in a philosophical cabinet in the company of an adult, who convinces us, in all seriousness, that there is a reasonable doubt that he has two hands. That what we together are looking at is a square drawn on a piece of paper, that the people around him – therefore including us – have a mind, that the world existed yesterday, last week, a hundred years ago, etc. Let us also suppose that he is not led to these doubts by irresponsible and thoughtless reasons, but exclusively good and constructive ones.[6] Think as carefully as possible about the presented situation.
The first problem is: What does the term “hand” mean, when there are reasonable doubts that his upper limbs are what we are both looking at, now? What should the said sound say? Can such a term have a meaning? If yes, then what kind? When another person talks about his hands and says that he cannot be sure if he has them, whether there are two of them, whether there were two of them yesterday, and he is looking at them, what should he think? To what does he assign them when he concludes that he cannot be certain about them? I cannot find an answer to any of these questions.
This is not all. I cannot even imagine how I would convince someone that he is wrong about his upper limbs. I cannot imagine how I can explain to someone with complete seriousness that he really does have two hands, that he had two hands yesterday, last week, etc. Regardless of how hard I try, I do not know what strategy I should employ to do so. In other words, I have no conception of the specific implications of this kind of doubt. I have no idea about the further development of a situation in which someone looks at his own hands, sees that there are no scars on them, but at the same time has doubts that he possessed them yesterday. (I have no conception of step two, three, four, etc.)
Let us move on from the term “hand” to the term “square”. The problem we come across is this: If what we are looking at together is a clearly drawn flat geometric shape on paper, composed of four lines of equal length, the internal angles of which are together 360°, and someone with complete seriousness convinces us that he cannot be sure it is a square, then what is he talking about? What is he comparing this shape drawn on paper to?
Let us try to imagine what possibilities are offered to us. The mentioned person may talk about something that is not flat (it could be spatial). Alternatively, he may be thinking of something not made up of four-line segments (it could be comprised of five-line segments); or something that has an interior angle content of less than (or greater than) 360°; or something that has no interior angles. He may even be thinking of something that is not a geometric shape. We should perhaps stop here: A square that is not made up of four-line segments and is not a geometric figure (a square that is not a square)? At first sight, it should be obvious that we are on highly shaky ground here. We will soon conclude that – regardless of whether we are in a cabinet or on the street – we cannot hold on to this.
On this basis, I ask: Does a question that asked about the meaning of the term “square” as something in which four lines of equal length do not play a role really make sense? If yes, then what kind of sense? And further: Is it possible for a situation in which the sound “square” uttered by someone else has an objective meaning to make sense, although at the same time this someone cannot be sure that he has in mind a geometric figure composed of four-line segments? Is it possible to proceed in this way? I do not want to be more suggestive than necessary – because I do not think it is necessary at all – but if this makes any sense, then something fundamental is eluding me.
We should at this point not omit that within the parameters of the induced situation there is no room for one alternative, which is otherwise fully available to us within normal communication. I am talking about the possibility to be assured about what was meant when someone said something: to make certain that we understood correctly. The point is that, within the framework of the idea of meanings associated with facts, we constantly can ask the other person a question: What do you mean? What did you mean to say when you said there are reasonable doubts about this being a square? Do you want to look at it again? Etc. This is an essential possibility that under normal circumstances, we can turn to, and which can (at least theoretically) help us overcome misunderstanding.[7]
On the other hand, in the framework of meanings not associated with facts this possibility (even theoretically) does not work. Why? In a situation in which the other person cannot be sure, whether we really have a mind or not this alternative simply does not come under consideration. If we accept as a reasonable doubt that the people around us do not have a mind, then there is no room for ensuring what they meant when they said something. On the contrary, a deep division occurs here between a) their perspectives, b) my perspective. I ask: On what basis would we demand assurance from someone whose mind we are uncertain about? For what reason should we do this? Moreover, how could it occur to anyone else to demand assurance from us, if our mind was to be problematic for him or her? Views on such a thing are conflicting. It is evident that this alternative falls away completely within the idea of meanings not associated with facts.
We should also recall that, within the parameters of the induced situation, we not only lose the possibility of being assured, but we also lose several categories based on which our thinking normally works. Aside from the category of “truth”, we are losing sight of the exact meaning of the term “evident”. After a more careful reassessment, we find that in a state in which we admit that we cannot be certain whether the world existed yesterday, last week, even a hundred years ago, etc., it is difficult to find something concrete that we could express through the use of this term. In fact, we can only guess how it looks when something is “evident”, if it is not evident to us that the world existed yesterday. (We can only guess how it looks like when something is a “truth”, if it is not a truth for us that the world existed last week.)
The understanding that something is evident and something else is not plays an irreplaceable role for the smooth functioning of the communication we take part in daily. I will give an example: How could I find out that I had discovered an adequate answer to any question, if I did not understand the term “evident”? How could I know that I am not mistaken in my answer? The answer is simple: I have no way of knowing. Within the parameters of the given situation, truth cannot be distinguished from error.[8] It appears that in the scope of meanings not associated with facts everything can be a mistake, or true.
At this point it is necessary to recall that for us to be sure of something – to reject some hypothesis or to accept it – there must first be an understanding of what it means for something to be “evident” (“clear”, “obvious”, “certain”, etc.). This does not function in the reverse order. In other words, a prerequisite for any step on this ground is the generally accepted understanding that something can emerge as a good reason and something else cannot. If we do not have available such an understanding – and if this understanding is not common to me and to the other – how could we find anything out? How could we be sure about anything – theoretical or practical? Based on what?
In the parameters of the induced situation, we find no such thing as an understanding of what it means for something to be a good reason. (We do not find it, so to speak, by a definition.) In addition, we do not even have anything on whose basis we could assume it. Indeed, what could someone who is not sure that the world existed yesterday consider a good reason? It is highly likely that this will be something completely different from what we consider it to be. In any case, this means that here we do not have, metaphorically speaking, solid ground beneath our feet. We have nothing neutral available which we could compare (and, for example, form connections), we have nothing objective. All we have available within the idea of meanings not associated with facts are our subjective conjectures and unfalsifiable hypotheses.[9] More precisely, we have the possibility to believe that we understand the meanings of the sounds that someone speaks under the given circumstances, but there is no way for us to know this.[10]
We arrive at the realisation that without an exact meaning of the term “evident” (“obvious”, “normal”, “certain”, etc.), our talking about communication by which we deliver some concrete – and not just any – sense does not have any sense. At the same time, in the framework of the idea of meanings not associated with facts, we do not find any meaning of the term “evident”. From this, it follows that talking about communication – and about the meanings of terms – does not make concrete sense regarding this idea.
II.
A substantive reassessment of the state in which Descartes, according to the Meditations, found himself for days – and in which many modern authors see no trouble at all – takes us to general considerations about the nature of language and about what makes it able to fulfill its role.
It is true that to have the possibility to doubt – whether about something local or universal – we must have linguistic signs available. No hypothesis, question, answer, etc., can be formulated without signs that we understand. Without language, it would be impossible to doubt (or even not to doubt). It is also true that to be able to present something like a sceptical argument – and for it to be understood as such by someone else – the terms from which this argument is constructed must have exact meanings. Of course, these exact meanings must be objective.
However, it is not enough to assume or even to postulate the objectivity of meaning. The meanings of the terms must be common to him and me. Otherwise, doubt (and nothing else) cannot be rationally reconstructed.
For the terms from which our arguments are built to have objective meaning, several conditions must first be met. Several things must fall into place. Among them is, for example, the generally accepted understanding of what it means for something to be “evident”. (Naturally, at the same time, a generally accepted understanding of what it is like when something is not like that must also exist.) As already mentioned, without these insights, we are unable to make a single move within communication. On the other hand, the existence of such a thing as a generally accepted understanding is built on the fact that we have available – among many other things – the possibility of being assured about what was meant when someone said something. In other words, an understanding that something is the case and something else is not presupposes one essential possibility, and that is to ask the other person: What did you mean to say when you said there are reasonable doubts about this being a square? Don’t you want to look again? Etc.
Neither for former nor for the latter – for an insight into what is “evident” or for the possibility of being assured about what was meant – we find no room within the idea of meanings not associated with facts. This is an important aspect for us.
Thanks to it, we arrive at the key question of this reassessment: Can our self-evident beliefs about the world be separated from the objective meanings of the terms we use as easily as Descartes imagined? Can the external, which gives me no sense to doubt, be separated from what the sounds I utter mean, without something fundamental being disturbed? For example: Can the certainty that I have two hands be separated from what it means that something is certain? Can the conviction that I had two hands yesterday be separated from what it means to be convinced about something?
Based on Descartes’s approach, this should not be an issue. On one side are our self-evident beliefs; on the other are the objective meanings of our terms and methodological principles. On the one side is everything external, which makes no sense for me to doubt; on the other side is what the uttered sounds mean. A clear line should be drawn between one and the other. Sceptical arguments from the Meditations should relate exclusively to the first, while the latter should remain unaffected by them. This is the basic assumption on which the idea of meanings not associated with facts is, in fact, built. “And when I said that the proposition I am thinking, therefore I exist is the first and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way, I did not in saying that deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and that it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and ones which on their own provide us with no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think they needed to be listed”.[11] In my view, however, Descartes is mistaken precisely in this basic assumption of his philosophical idea. To separate our beliefs about the world from the meanings of our terms in this way means to end up with unresolvable inconsistencies. (I tried to point out some of them in the previous section.)
In this regard, I consider Donald Davidson’s so-called “holistic approach” as more promising. Based on his works on semantics and epistemology, there is a close – intimate – connection between our publicly presented beliefs about the world and the objective nature of the meanings of our terms, and it is impossible to draw a clear line within this connection.[12] It is impossible to stand up and state: this is where our beliefs end, and the meanings of our terms begin. Or: this is where the meanings of our terms end, and our self-evident beliefs about the world begin. The idea of such a boundary is a myth.
According to Davidson, our publicly presented beliefs about the world freely pass into the meanings of our terms, and the meanings of our terms, in turn, pass into our beliefs about the external world. „The credibility of the position is improved by reflection on the close relations between language and the attribution of attitudes such as belief, desire, and intention. On the one hand, it is clear that speech requires a multitude of finely discriminated intentions and beliefs. A person who asserts that perseverance keeps honour bright must, for example, represent himself as believing that perseverance keeps honour bright, and he must intend to represent himself as believing it”.[13]
For this reason, separating the meanings of our terms from beliefs about the world, as if they were somehow unrelated in the framework of considerations of communication that really works, is simply inadequate. Of course, the idea of meanings not associated with facts separates meanings from beliefs quite absolutely and resolutely.
III.
How is it possible that Descartes does not see any of the questions that arose when reassessing his concept? How is it that he seems to show no interest in the inconsistencies?
Descartes starts from the fundamental conviction that every human individual is gifted with free will. In line with this belief, such an individual can constantly decide whether to do something or not: whether to leave or stay, whether to raise his hand or not, etc. Descartes claims that the idea that we have free will – and can decide whether to do something – is the greatest idea that our minds can ever understand. This quality is precisely the reason why it should be possible to meaningfully say that we were created in the image of God. „It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and likeness of God“.[14]
I assume that the conviction in our free will is to a crucial measure responsible for the fact that this author does not see any of the inconsistencies I discussed in part I. From his point of view, the entire matter is obvious: If we have freedom of choice, then a way to think what we want must exist. If we were truly gifted with it, then it must be possible to think of a “square” without four lines of equal length; it must be possible to separate our self-evident beliefs from the meanings of our terms, or to doubt everything external and at the same time not to question anything about linguistic signs. As if he asks: Why should I not doubt everything external and at the same time not doubt linguistic signs when I want to? Why should I not be able to stand up and clearly separate my beliefs about the world from the meanings of my terms when I choose to do so? What could stand in the way of my making such a decision?
From Descartes’s Meditations emanates a deep individualistic conviction, according to which the idea of meanings not associated with facts – and not only this – is exclusively a matter of my own will. It seems that in association with this, we should not be concerned with anything more than our personal decision (we should not even want to ask anything else). We should concentrate on just one specific dilemma: Will I find sufficient strength within, and will I doubt all the facts of the world that I have thus far accepted, or rather not? Shall I commit to this step, or will I yield again?
It seems that nothing stands out as a factor in this connection but the strength of our own determination, as if nothing else played an active role here. In other words, all relevant questions regarding the idea of meanings not associated with facts should relate exclusively to my own choice. Other aspects – for example logical one – should be irrelevant.[15]
This is ultimately the reason why, from Descartes’s – and not only his – perspective, a substantive review from parts I and II certainly would not make any sense. On the contrary, it would seem to be a consequence of a deep misunderstanding (and a waste of time).
I wish to add to what has been said thus far: I am also deeply convinced that a person is gifted with free will and can decide whether to do something or not. At the same time, however, I think that this fundamental conviction is not in conflict with the fact that we simply do not have the opportunity to do some things (in the sense that we are unable to do them, or they never even occur to us). This is how things are, regardless of whether we like it or not. In a sense, we have just met with a trivial aspect of freedom that we observe in the world. Despite its triviality, several important things follow from it. First, that anything cannot ever be accepted as true. In no case can anything be true! Claiming that it could be so under certain circumstances is just an example of empty verbalism. In fact, every conceptual framework in which something like this makes sense – even if only for a few moments – is problematic.
Second, anything cannot ever happen. We may become witnesses to shocking anomalies, but anything that we make up cannot ever be accepted as real! We should not lose sight of the fact that our ability to invent and to model has also its limits. In contrast to this, anyone who states that when he decides, he can doubt everything external is claiming nothing more than that anything can be true under certain conditions, or anything can realistically happen. In this statement lies the content that the advocate of meanings not associated with facts is promoting: Under extraordinary circumstances, anything can be true – or real.
I strongly disagree with the presented statement. I believe this is utterly mistaken content. The concept of a situation in which anything can be true does not work and cannot be further developed (we have no idea about step two, three, four, etc.). Therefore, it is not intelligent. We do not find any objective meaning of terms and methodological principles in its framework – as I tried to show in part I. We only run into subjective conjectures and unfalsifiable hypotheses. However, the communication of an exact meaning cannot be reconstructed based on subjective conjectures and unfalsifiable hypotheses.[16] From this it follows that in the moment we accept that anything can be true – for constructive reasons – our talk of “truth”, “constructive reasons” etc. ceases to make sense. At that moment, we lose the solid ground beneath our feet.
Of course, the fact that we do not have the opportunity to do some things does not limit our freedom. On the contrary, the fact that some things do not occur to me at all or are beyond my reach co-creates a logical space for each of my choices. This means that I remain a free individual, although I have no possibility (in all seriousness) to doubt that, for example, the world existed yesterday, a hundred years ago, etc. On the other hand, precisely what does not permit me to do certain things and does not leave space for certain acts gives me the opportunity to enter an effective communicative exchange with other individuals. It is specifically the rules that I must learn – for example, the rules for correctly forming the past tenses – that allow me to utter sounds that my surroundings understand and respond to. Any autonomous decision-making of mine is born on this basis. Without grammar and its rules, the occurrence of something like this would be very tricky for our understanding.
It is not possible to acquire a language without at the same time, metaphorically speaking, being deprived of certain rights. Why? Learning to correctly use the expressive means of language rests in being ready to accept many instructions without additional questions and a willingness to perform many actions as if automatically. Without this unconscious handing over of extensive competences over one’s own mind to grammar of language, there is no thinking. However, obeying the rules of the grammar does not mean losing freedom! That is a mistake. What it means is acquiring a key skill – exchanging an exact meaning with other people – without which freedom of decision itself would not be rationally understood. The terms “freedom” or “justification” or any other would not even exist if everything we do not have the opportunity to do were not here first.
We come to realise that our autonomously deciding between different alternatives does not make sense until there are – as paradoxical as it sounds – boundaries that we are not able objectively to cross.
Conclusion
Within this investigation, we concluded that we are unable to understand the situation in which we have the objective meanings of basic terms and methodological principles available, but at the same time, we are not sure of anything about the world. Such a state is beyond the power of our understanding.
We likewise discovered that since we have free will, we could decide that we understand such a situation (for example, out of respect for Descartes). Simply, we can postulate that we understand such a concept and no longer deal with this matter. (This is probably going to be the prevailing reaction to this reassessment.)
Regardless of what can or cannot be postulated, after critically reconsidering the presented situation, we came across a few paradoxes, and these inconsistencies led us in part I to conclude, that the idea of meanings not associated with facts is not intelligible. It only seems to us that we understand it (as it might seem to us to understand the concept of the highest natural number or the most distant place in the universe). In fact, since its introduction, the mentioned concept has only misled us. It directs us to incorrect conceptions about the architecture of our knowledge, to mistaken questions about the category of certainty, to dilemmas about the origin of the terms of psychology, which do not move us forward, but rather hold us back, etc.
Why does the concept hinder us? Because of what is intrinsically characteristic of the functioning communication. When in part II we considered what conditions must be met so that we could be able to communicate with each other through the expressive means of language, we found out that we do not find them at all within the mentioned idea. On the contrary, these conditions are neither present in it nor necessary for it. Yet without these conditions being fulfilled – for example, without the accepted understanding of what is “evident”, or without the possibility of being assured about what was meant, etc. – the objective meaning of terms and principles disappears from our thinking. In addition, regardless of whether we are devoting ourselves to theoretical research or practical issues, we end up on extremely shaky ground, on which we have no way to stand.
We should here remember that the rules of grammar are not dependent on our subjective decisions or theoretical efforts. (Something like that happens only exceptionally.) On the contrary, our decisions and theoretical efforts are normally conditioned by the rules of grammar. This means that grammar and its general structure are primary, and subjective decisions and innovations can be born inside the individual only subsequently. Therefore, with the “correct philosophical approach” it is not possible to work from the subjective to the objective, as Descartes tries to do through the idea of meanings not associated with facts. That is a categorical mistake. It is also not possible to first discover the unquestionable within – in one’s thinking – and then open one’s eyes to the external world. Such an approach may seem attractive and exotic, but it does not work (although Descartes probably did not doubt it for a moment).
The meaning of the term “unquestionable” enters our interior from outside. We learn it based on the sensory data we register about the outside world. We do not acquire it, figuratively speaking, with our eyes closed. For the most part, we obtain it with the collisions with external objects: “In giving up the dualism between scheme and world, we do not give up the world but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false”.[17]
What does this mean? In the correct philosophical approach, we should attempt to get from what is objectively valid to what is subjectively valid and not proceed as the author of the Meditations. In a systematic approach, what is generally valid always has methodological priority over what I select and choose as an individual (the first- and third-person plural should take precedence over the first-person singular).
What’s more, when we think more carefully about the structure of the language we apply, we find out that an internal harmony between what its users agree on as self-evident and what meanings its terms possess rules within its framework. As has already been stated, I agree in this regard with the holistic approach to semantics, according to which the connection between our beliefs on the one side and meanings of our terms on the other represents an essential – supporting – element for successful communication.[18] In other words, without the general agreement that here are two hands, that this is a square drawn on paper, the world existed yesterday, etc., terms like “hand”, “square”, “yesterday”, etc., would have no meaning.
Without a publicly presented consensus regarding a considerable number of things, we would have no meaningful sounds, no doubts, no questions, no answers, etc. Proponents of meanings not associated with facts are unaware that in a situation in which we cannot be certain of external facts, we should not be certain of the meanings of terms either.[19] We have no possibility of being sure about them because we have nothing to base it on. We have nothing solid – neutral – beneath our feet. We only have subjective conjectures and hypotheses, which seem to be hanging in the air. In other words, when we lose facts, we also lose objective meanings. Regardless of whether we are on the street or in a philosophical cabinet, one does not work without the other.
Despite sincere respect for Descartes’s rationalist legacy, I thus come to the substantive conclusion that the situation with which he operates as with something intelligent in his writings is a mistake. This is the kind of creation of the Reason that has failed. The idea of meanings not associated with facts cannot be rationally understood or even be feasible in reality. If someone states that he was in such a state – for a few moments, or even days – he is not telling the truth. No one has been in such a state – nor Descartes, anyone else – because it is not possible (just as it is not possible to find the highest natural number or the most distant place in the universe). What is possible is to believe it when we have decided to believe it.
I concluded that the idea of meanings not associated with facts should no longer be worked on as if there could be no doubt about it. If someone feels the need to work with it, then it is necessary to return to it and rework it: to adjust it so that it can be thought of without problems, or so that it is feasible in reality. In the form in which we come across it in Descartes’s Meditations, it is an example of a concept that does not need to be regarded in debates.
This paper was written as part of the grant VEGA, no. 1/0534/25.
I am in debt to Tomáš Károly and Jana Tomašovičová for helpful comments.
R e f e r e n c e s
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DAVIDSON, D.: Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Clarendon 2004.
DAVIDSON, D.: The Essential Davidson. Oxford: Clarendon 2006.
DESCARTES, R.: Principles of Philosophy. In: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I. London: Cambridge University 1985, pp. 177-292.
DESCARTES, R.: Meditations on First Philosophy. In: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II. London: Cambridge University 2005, pp. 3-62.
HALE, B.: Basic Logical Knowledge. In: O´HEAR, A. (ed.): Logic, Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University 2002, pp. 279-304.
HUSSERL, E.: Cartesian Meditations. Hague: Nijhoff 1960.
HUSSERL, E.: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University 1970.
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KOEBER, M.: Certainties of a World-picture: The epistemological Investigations of the On Certainty. In: The SLUGA, H. – STERN, D. (eds.): Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University 1996, pp. 411-441.
KRIPKE, S.: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2002.
MOYALL-SHARROCK, D.: Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty. In: GLOCK, H. J. – HYMAN, J. (eds.): A Companion to Wittgenstein. Gichester: Basil Blackwell 2017, pp. 547-562.
SCHÖNBAUMSFELD, G.: The Illusion of Doubt. Oxford: Clarendon 2016.
WILLIAMS, M.: Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991.
WILLIAMS, M.: Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University 2001.
WITTGENSTEIN, L.: On Certainty. New York: Harper and Row 1972.
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N o t e s
[1] See DESCARTES, R.: Meditations on First Philosophy. In: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II. London: Cambridge University 2005, pp. 3-62.
[2] See DESCARTES, R.: Meditations on First Philosophy, pp. 28.
[3] See HUSSERL, E.: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University 1970, §17. KOEBER, M.: Certainties of a World-picture: The epistemological Investigations of the On Certainty. In: SLUGA, H. – STERN, D. (eds.): Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University 1996, pp. 411-441, pp. 437. HALE, B.: Basic Logical Knowledge. In: O´HEAR, A. (ed.): Logic, Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University 2002, pp. 279-304, pp. 279. CONANT, J.: Varieties of Scepticism. In: MCMANUS, D. (ed.): Wittgenstein and Scepticism. London: Routledge 2004, pp. 97-136, pp. 109. Etc.
[4] See HUSSERL, E.: Cartesian Meditations. Hague: Nijhoff 1960. WILLIAMS, M.: Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991. WILLIAMS, M.: Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University 2001. Etc.
[5] See WITTGENSTEIN, L.: On Certainty. New York: Harper and Row 1972. SCHÖNBAUMSFELD, G.: The Illusion of Doubt. Oxford: Clarendon 2016. Etc.
[6] See HUSSERL, E.: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, §17. CONANT, J.: Varieties of Scepticism, pp. 110. Etc.
[7] See WITTGENSTEIN, L.: On Certainty, §3.
[8] See WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1999, §258.
[9] See WRIGHT, C.: Intuition, Entitlement and the Epistemology of Logical Laws. In: Dialectica, 58, 2004, pp. 155-175, pp. 165. MOYALL-SHARROCK, D.: Wittgenstein on Knowledge and Certainty. In: GLOCK, H. J. – HYMAN, J. (eds.): A Companion to Wittgenstein. Gichester: Basil Blackwell 2017, pp. 547-562, pp. 550.
[10] See KRIPKE, S.: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 2002, pp. 7-15.
[11] DESCARTES, R.: Principles of Philosophy. In: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I. London: Cambridge University 1985, pp. 177-292, pp. 196.
[12] See DAVIDSON, D.: Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Clarendon 2004. DAVIDSON, D.: The Essential Davidson. Oxford: Clarendon 2006. Etc.
[13] DAVIDSON, D.: The Essential Davidson, pp. 198.
[14] DESCARTES, R.: Meditations on First Philosophy, pp. 40.
[15] See HUSSERL, E.: Cartesian Meditations, WILLIAMS, M.: Problems of Knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Epistemology, Etc.
[16] See KENNY, A.: Cartesian Privacy. In: PITCHER, G. (ed.): Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. New York: Doubleday and Company 1966, pp. 352-370, pp. 369. KRIPKE, S.: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages, pp. 11. Etc.
[17] DAVIDSON, D.: The Essential Davidson, pp. 208.
[18] See WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Philosophical Investigations, DAVIDSON, D.: Problems of Rationality. Etc.
[19] See WITTGENSTEIN, L.: On Certainty, §114.
doc. Mgr. Tomáš Čana, PhD.
Department of Philosophy and Applied Philosophy
University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava
Námestie J. Herdu 2
917 01 Trnava
e-mail: tomas.cana73@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-0378-3069